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SYMPOSIUM ON HEARSAYAND IMPLIED ASSERTIONS:
HOW WOULD (OR SHOULD) THE SUPREME COURT
DECIDE THE KEARLEY CASE?
FOREWORD TO THE FIRST VIRTUAL FORUM:
WALLACE STEVENS, BLACKBIRDS AND THE HEARSAY RULE
Craig R. Callen*
I. THE VIRTUAL FORUM
The Mississippi College Law Review is publishing this virtual forum, which we
believe is an innovative mode of interaction among legal scholars. It consists of
essays on a recurring and difficult question of evidence law, followed by an edit-
ed transcript of an electronic discussion of the topic among the essayists and
seven other commentators.'
Three developments combined to stimulate this forum.
First was the House of Lords' recent reaffirmance of Wright v. Tatham2 in
Regina v. Kearley.3 Wright classified a set of letters, offered to show the
addressee's competence to make a will, as hearsay under English law. The writ-
ers of the letters would doubtless have expected the addressee, based on their let-
ters, either to infer that the writers thought he was competent or to strengthen an
assumption that they thought he was competent, but they did not directly convey
such an opinion in the letters. Every evidence coursebook discusses Wright, and
similar problems recur in the federal courts even today, particularly in regard to
drug prosecutions and police raids of various sorts.4 Kearley considered whether
police testimony that a single caller asked for the defendant, and for drugs,
should be admissible to show that the defendant (who admittedly possessed a
small amount of drugs) possessed drugs for the purpose of sale. Relying heavily
on Wright, stare decisis, and the belief that changes in the hearsay rule were a
matter for Parliament, the Kearley Court held that the requests should be hearsay.
* Visiting Professor, University of Colorado School of Law. Professor, Mississippi College School of Law.
B.A., University of Iowa; J.D., Harvard Law School. I would like to thank Professors Christopher B. Mueller,
Scott F. Norberg, Roger C. Park, Ron Shapira, and Eleanor Swift for their generosity in commenting on drafts,
and Daphne K. Stonestreet for excellent research assistance. In this Foreword, I describe the arguments of col-
leagues for whom I have the highest regard in terms that are strictly my own - they might not argue with my
descriptions.
1. A word about the mechanics. Upon receiving each essay in this Symposium, the staff of the law review
distributed copies to the other essayists and to additional commentators participating in the electronic discus-
sion about the essays. The discussion began on June 1, 1995, and ended on August 1, 1995. The editors and I
have edited and annotated the various contributions to the electronic exchange, and have arranged them accord-
ing to topic for ease of comprehension.
2. 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (K.B. 1837).
3. See Extracts from Kearley (Craig R. Callen ed., 1995), 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 197, for a summary of the
opinions (or speeches in English terminology) in Kearley.
4. See e.g., United States v. Gaines, 726 E Supp. 1457 (E.D. Pa.) affd, 902 F.2d 1558 (3d Cir. 1989);
People v. Scalzi, 179 Cal. Rptr. 61 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); State v. Tolisano, 70 A.2d 118 (1949).
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The second stimulus was the continuing debate over new theories' about the
proper scope of the hearsay rule under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The dis-
parate theories rest on differing understandings of the problems that hearsay, or
for that matter, any other evidence, poses for factfinders. I refer to these under-
standings as "models" and discuss them in the next section. These models are
not mutually exclusive, but adherents of a particular model do tend to use similar
arguments and roughly the same test for distinguishing between hearsay and non-
hearsay. While most understandings of hearsay yield the same result for relative-
ly easy problems, they are not wholly reconcilable. For example, Professor Park
has identified the inconsistency between what I refer to as strict application of
the "explicitness-based" and "dangers-based" models.6 Scholars and courts have
used as many as nine distinct approaches, perhaps too many for comfort, but still
four fewer than Wallace Stevens' thirteen ways of looking at a blackbird
The final stimulus was the Internet - already a vehicle for academic commu-
nication and the means through which the interchange at the end of this
Symposium took place. Through the essay and electronic interchange format,
this exchange analyzes a new development in the law of hearsay, the Kearley
case, and provides a forum in which persons with different perspectives can
interact relatively directly, without the barriers of time and formality that publi-
cation of a series of articles in a number ofjournals can create.
II. TIHE MODELS OF IMPLIED ASSERTIONS
The participants in the forum, essayists and commentators alike, are distin-
guished and insightful scholars whose work has already amply introduced them
to students of evidence. Moreover, there are so many participants that an attempt
to introduce them and summarize their work would probably amount to nothing
more than a bloated table of contents. This Foreword will not, then, be of the
classic "Pat Smith offers an insightful analysis of X" format. It seems more use-
ful to introduce readers to the problem of implied assertions, shorthand for the
sort of question critical in Wright and Kearley, and to summarize the different
attempts to resolve that problem.
The Federal Rules of Evidence say that " '[h]earsay' is a statement, other than
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evi-
5. Most of the theories of hearsay discussed below do have some historical antecedents. Given that the the-
ories relate to a rule of evidence with considerable historical background, it is unlikely that any theory would be
wholly new. On balance, it does seem fairly clear that a number of approaches have survived after the adoption
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and new variations have developed.
6. Roger C. Park, McCormick on Evidence and the Concept of Hearsay: A Critical Analysis Followed by
Suggestions to Law Teachers, 65 MINN. L. REv. 423, 427 (1981). See infra notes 21-29, 34-35 and accompany-
ing text. I have used the term "literalist" elsewhere to refer to all the theories I call here "explicitness-based."
Craig R. Callen, Hearsay and Informal Reasoning, 47 VAND. L. REv. 43, 46 n.9 (1994). Professor Mueller has
persuaded me that the term is a bit too partisan (at least for all of the three explicitness-based theories) and it
was never a really comfortable fit with Professor Park's analysis. I do, however, believe the term "strict literal-
ism" accurately describes one way of determining whether a statement is hearsay for a proposition it is offered
to show. See infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
7. WALLACE STEVENS, Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird, in THE PALM AT THE END OF THE MIND:
SELECTED POEMS AND A PLAY 20 (Holly Stevens, ed. 1969).
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dence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."' A statement, in turn, is "(1) an
oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by
the person as an assertion."9 Federal Rule 802 makes hearsay inadmissible
unless within an exception." That definition of hearsay leaves open many possi-
ble interpretations of the terms "assert" and "assertion," as well as the question
whether the clause beginning with "if" in the second definition of a statement
refers only to nonverbal conduct. 1 The Advisory Committee's Notes for this
portion of the Rules are cryptic at best. 2 As a result, the pre-Federal Rules
debate over the distinction between hearsay and nonhearsay has continued after
the adoption of the Rules.
Some of the readers of this Symposium may be familiar with the extensive lit-
erature that discusses the topic of implied assertions.' 3 Many others might find
themselves suddenly in the middle of a debate with which they have only passing
familiarity. For the latter readers, and for students who are in the throes of their
initial attempt to understand the problem, it seems useful to think of the debate in
terms of models of the problem under the Federal Rules.
Models of the definition of hearsay, and thus of the problem of implied asser-
tions, each focus on some inferential problems that evaluation of out-of-court
conduct 4 may create for the factfinder. Adherence to a particular model strongly
correlates with choice of standards for deciding whether a statement is hearsay if
offered to show a proposition at trial - a judgment based largely on the models'
identification of critical hearsay dangers or risks.' Each model is associated
with two or three alternative standards: for example, there are three standards for
8. FED. R. EVID. 801(C).
9. FED. R. EviD. 801(a). FED. R.'EviD. 801(d) creates certain exclusions from the hearsay rules not relevant
here.
10. FED. R. EvID. 802.
11. See David E. Seidelson, Implied Assertions and Federal Rule of Evidence 801: A Quandary for Federal
Courts, 24 DuQ. L. REV. 741, 764 (1986).
12. E.g., RONALD J. ALLEN & RICHARD B. KUHNS, AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH TO EVIDENCE: TEXT, PROBLEMS
AND CASES 323-24 (1989); CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 8.14, at 822-24
(1995); Seidelson, supra note 11, at 756, 759; Olin Guy Wellborn III, The Definition of Hearsay in the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 61 TEX. L. REV. 49, 71-91 (1982).
13. The Wright case, is of course, over 150 years old. For most practical purposes, discussion in American
scholarship dates from JOHN H. WIGMORE, 3 A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON
LAW §§ 1715, 1788, 1790 (1904). Professor Shapira pointed out to me that the roots of the hearsay rule go
back considerably further. In Gwyneth Matthews' translation of Plato's THEAETETUS 201, Socrates asks:
Then when judges are rightly persuaded about things that it is possible for only an eye-witness to
know, but otherwise not, then, arriving at their verdict from hear-say [sic] and acquiring true belief,
do they give their verdict without knowledge, being rightly persuaded, given that they are judging
correctly?
GwYNETH MATTHEWS, PLATO'S EPISTEMOLOGY AND RELATED LOGICAL PROBLEMS 199 (1972).
14. I use the term "conduct" here because non-verbal behavior, such as pointing, may be a statement for pur-
poses of the hearsay rule. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, § 8.5, at 798. Moreover, advocates of the
dangers-based approach may argue that conduct should be hearsay when offered for certain purposes even
though the actor did not intend her actions to convey any information to anyone. E.g., Laurence H. Tribe,
Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARv. L. REV. 957, 972 (1974).
15. The reader should not understand the order in which I discuss the models as a designation of relative
merit. In fact, as I have said elsewhere, I strongly believe that a version of the third, communicative intention-
based model, is the proper standard for distinguishing between hearsay and nonhearsay. Callen, supra note 6.
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determining the matters a communication asserts that are associated with what I
call the explicitness-based model. None of these standards is identical to any
standard associated with another model."8 Nevertheless, analyses of some prob-
lems by, for example, adherents of the explicitness-based and dangers models
who use flexible criteria for delineating the limits of the hearsay rule may look
much the same." For the purpose of this introduction, the models are only
offered as descriptions rather than as an attempt to postulate an a priori frame-
work for hearsay analysis. Courts and commentators may employ different mod-
els for different problems,' 8 or they may attempt to meld one or more models.' 9
Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that classifying an implied assertion as
hearsay does not entail the conclusion that it is inadmissible:20 there are a num-
ber of exceptions that may apply to specific out-of-court statements.
Here are thumbnail sketches of the models.
Model 1: The Explicitness-based Model
For advocates of the explicitness-based model, the central problem that evalu-
ating the probative value of out-of-court statements and conduct that is the equiv-
alent of a statement 2' poses for factfinders is the danger that the speaker2 2 may
have been insincere.23  Deception about X, in their eyes, is most likely to take
place when the speaker makes an explicit misstatement about X.24 Accordingly,
the advocates believe that, for any conduct to be hearsay, it must be a direct
assertion, or statement, of the proposition for which it is offered.25
16. In addition, commentators frequently advocate positions that they believe disagree with the relevant case
law. Professor Friedman, for example, believes that the rules as written require strict literalism. RICHARD D.
FRIEDMAN, THE ELEMENTS OF EVIDENCE 143 (1991). On strict literalism, see infra notes 28-29 and accompany-
ing text. He also believes that test is not optimal. Richard D. Friedman, Route Analysis of Credibility and
Hearsay, 96 YALE L.J. 667, 723-29 (1987). Professor Park advocates a flexible version of the explicitness-
based analysis (see infra notes 32-33 and accompanying text), not as the ideal approach but because (i) he
believes his flexible analysis squares with the language of the rule, but avoids the worst problems of strict liter-
alism, and (ii) he believes that any further broadening of the reach of the hearsay definition would require an
amendment of the rule, incurring costs that would outweigh any social benefit. Roger C. Park, "I Didn 't Tell
Them Anything About You": Implied Assertions as Hearsay Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 MINN. L.
REV. 783, 829-38 (1990).
17. For an example of similar results compare infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text with notes 46-47
and accompanying text.
18. Professor Park has pointed out that courts tend to use the strict literalist analysis (see infra notes 27-29
and accompanying text) when hearsay dangers are minimal. Park, supra note 16, at 836.
19. E.g., RICHARD 0. LEMPERT & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE: TEXT,
PROBLEMS, TRANSCRIPTS AND CASES 363-64 (2d ed. 1983).
20. Edmund M. Morgan, Hearsay and Non-hearsay, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1138, 1147 (1935).
21. 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 250, at 107 (John W Strong et al. eds., 4th Practitioners' ed., 1992).
22. For simplicity, where evidence is the product of a communication, I will typically refer to the conduct
and the relevant actors as if the evidence at issue were an oral utterance.
23. E.g., GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 63, at 196 (2d ed. 1987). Under
this analysis, ambiguous statements are less dangerous because the ambiguity is sufficiently obvious to make
the factfinder wary. See, e.g., LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 19, at 398; Tribe, supra note 14, at 969 n.42.
24. See, e.g., 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 21, § 250, at ll 10. See also Paul S. Milich, Re-Examining Hearsay
Under the Federal Rules: Some Method for the Madness, 39 KAN. L. REV. 893, 909 (1991).
25. E.g., LILLY, supra note 23, at 195.
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Users of explicitness-based models do recognize that factfinders confronted
with an out-of-court statement may make mistaken assumptions about the accu-
racy of the speaker's memory, perception, or use of language or gesture.
Nevertheless, they view the central danger of hearsay as the possibility that the
factfinder might mistakenly conclude that the speaker was sincere. 6 If, in con-
trast, the speaker made the statement while testifying, they believe that the oath,
the cross-examination and the jury's ability to observe the witness' demeanor
would help to check the risk that the factfinder might be misled by insincerity. 7
The most zealous proponents of the model, what one might call strict literalists,
would hold that neither the letters in Wright28 nor the call in Kearley should be
hearsay under the Federal Rules. They would contend that the out-of-court state-
ments involved in those cases did not directly assert29 the proposition for which
they were offered.
Less strict adherents, in deciding whether an utterance would be hearsay evi-
dence for a proposition, may look to the speaker's specific intent. Adherence to
that understanding avoids some of the more marked problems with strict literal-
ism. In contrast to the arguments in early editions of McCormick,"0 this more
flexible view would hold the statement "Harold is the finest of my sons" hearsay
to show that the declarant was fond of Harold. In contrast, the speaker of "Good
afternoon, Reuben," according to this analysis, would not specifically intend to
convey that the listener for whom she primarily intended the message was named
Reuben. Instead, she only intended to engage in social pleasantries.31 While this
view tends to avoid some extreme anomalies of explicitness-based analysis, the
specific intent approach would nevertheless hold the statements in Wright and
Kearley nonhearsay. It is fairly unlikely that the authors of the letters in Wright
had consciously intended to convey their impression of the testator's competence.
Nor was it likely that the callers in Kearley telephoned or knocked on the door
specifically to notify the persons they contacted that the defendant was selling
drugs.
Finally, the most flexible school of explicitness-based theory might argue that
an utterance should be hearsay for (or that it asserted) a proposition even though
26. See Edward J. lmwinkelried, The Importance of the Memory Factor in Analyzing the Reliability of
Hearsay Testimony: A Lesson Slowly Learnt - and Quickly Forgotten, 41 FLA. L. REV. 215, 219-24 (1989), on
the common law focus on the significance of the sincerity danger in analyzing hearsay.
27. LILLY, supra note 23, at 182.
28. 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 21, 247, at 99-100. Another argument would be that the statement amounted
to a verbal act if offered to show the character of the premisses. Id. at 102. The character of the premises does
not seem to be an ultimate fact in Kearley, or Wright, as opposed to a prosecution for conducting a gambling
establishment on which McCormick seems to rest the verbal act argument.
29. The Kearley opinion gives no indication that any of the callers ever said, in so many words, that the
defendant had sold drugs in the past, or that he possessed the drugs in question for sale.
30. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 228, at 465-66 (E. Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972).
31. The example is from STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., 3 FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 1225 (6th
ed. 1994). Milich, supra note 24, at 910-12, also seems to rely on a specific intent theory. Saltzburg, Martin,
and Capra do cite a communicative intention-based theory with seeming approval, in SALTZBURG, supra, at
n. 19, but their own analysis does not seem to square with it. On communicative intention-based theories, see
infra notes 37-47 and accompanying text.
1995]
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it did not directly state that proposition when (1) the utterance gave a marked
indication that the speaker consciously believed the proposition and intended the
communication to make at least one hearer aware of that belief, and (2) the utter-
ance's relevance for the purpose for which it is offered depends on the presence
of the belief. Suppose a suspected bank robber and his sister were having a
rather contentious conversation and the sister said "Well, at least I never robbed a
bank."32 The sister would not have directly stated that the suspect was a robber,
but her intent to convey that belief would be fairly likely. Moreover, if the state
offered the statement against the suspect, its relevance would depend on the
assumption that the sister believed the suspect had robbed the bank. Otherwise,
the statement would merely tend to show that the sister had avoided commission
of bank robbery. Adherents of this approach, which one might call "explicit
awareness," would tend to hold a single call in Kearley-type facts hearsay, but to
consider the letters in Wright nonhearsay 3 on the theory that the writers probably
unconsciously assumed, but did not consciously intend to convey, that the
addressee was competent.
Model 2: Dangers-based Model
For adherents of this model, the central reason for the hearsay rule is that it
limits the admissibility of out-of-court conduct without cross-examination of the
actor who engaged in that conduct. That might seem to coincide with explicit-
ness-based analysis, but the dangers-based approach tends to consider other
hearsay dangers in addition to sincerity. Classic hearsay dangers analysis (as do
most other hearsay analyses) posits four dangers that hearsay presents for the
factfinder: that she may draw mistaken conclusions about the speaker's accuracy
in perception, or her memory, that the meaning of the speaker's words or behav-
ior may be ambiguous, or that the speaker may have been insincere in engaging
in the conduct. In addition, particularly enthusiastic users of dangers-based
analysis may argue that conduct should be hearsay if its proffer creates any of the
four risks in any degree.
While the common conception of hearsay involves linguistic communications,
the committed advocates of the dangers-based model believe that conduct that is
not intended to communicate any information may present essentially the same
risks as spoken or written words. For example, the behavior of a ship captain
who walked around the ship, escorted his family aboard and embarked would
present some degree of the hearsay risks if offered to show the ship was seawor-
thy. Currently, that position is essentially an argument for hearsay reform rather
than a description of positive law. In fact, it is rare now to see an argument that
non-communicative conduct is hearsay under the Federal Rules, given that such a
conclusion is extremely difficult to square with the Rules or the Advisory
Committee's Notes. The drafters' repeated use of forms of the word "assert"
32. The example is from ALLEN & KuHNs, supra note 12, at 342. For an example of the flexible explicit-
ness-based analysis see Park, supra note 16, at 799.
33. Park, supra note 16, at 800-01.
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seems to remove evidence of non-communicative conduct from the strictures of
the hearsay rule.34
The staunchest adherents of the dangers-based theory argue for a broad inter-
pretation of the Federal Rules' definition of hearsay; they would hold both the
letters in Wright and the call in Kearley to be hearsay on the theory that each pre-
sented one or more hearsay dangers in regard to the inferences for which they
were offered.3" Less zealous adherents of the model may argue that whether con-
duct should be hearsay depends on the degree to which it raises hearsay dangers.
They may consider the statements in Wright and Kearley nonhearsay on the theo-
ry that the evidence did not present a sufficient quantum of hearsay risks; at the
least, they are likely to be very doubtful about Wright."6 These more flexible
supporters of the dangers-based model would tend to class non-communicative
conduct as nonhearsay on the theory that it would present insignificant hearsay
risks.
Two other models have essentially developed within the last two decades,
although their historical roots stretch much further back.
Model 3: Communicative Intention-based Model37
The courts and commentators who employ what I call the "communicative
intention" model believe that communicative conduct offered to show such gen-
erally intended propositions raises hearsay risks38 to the same extent as would
such conduct offered to show explicitly stated propositions. Communications,
34. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 801(a) advisory committee's note.
35. Even the strictest adherents of the dangers analysis tend to exclude conduct not designed to convey any
information from hearsay, because either (i) the Federal Rules appear to do so, or (ii) they believe that the con-
duct does not entail the hearsay risks to a significant degree. E.g., MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 801.3 (3d ed. 1991).
36. E.g., ALLEN & KUHNS, supra note 12, at 320-22. JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
1801(a)[01] (1995), appears to take a fairly strict literalist approach. A later section of the treatise argues that a
flexible dangers-based analysis is preferable. Id. I 801(c)[01], at 801-104 to 801-106.
37. I have advocated a form of analysis called co-operative analysis. Callen, supra note 6, at 82. It is clear
that Professors Mueller and Kirkpatrick employ notions of intention in analysis of hearsay. The similar use of
intention in our views leads me to classify us as adherents of the same model; an exploration of our differences,
at least from my standpoint, must wait for another time. Professor Wellborn's proposed rule, in Wellborn, supra
note 12, at 92-93, indicates a preference for analysis in terms of communication and beliefs that accord with
analysis of communicative intention in the terms I use infra in notes 38-39 and accompanying text. See Callen,
supra note 6, at 86. On the other hand, he doubts whether such a standard can fit with existing Federal Rule
801. Wellborn, supra note 12, at 92.
38. Professors Mueller and Kirkpatrick analyze the risks of hearsay in terms of the received description of
the dangers. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, § 8.2. I argue that there is one core danger, of which the
classic four dangers are aspects. That core danger is that the factfinder might lack information needed to evalu-
ate the extent to which the communicator was complying with the implicit conventions of communication such
that the communication could be relied on. Those conventions are: (i) that the speaker should be neither more
nor less informative than necessary; (ii) the utterance should relate to the purpose of the parties to the commu-
nication; (iii) the speaker should be perspicuous: orderly, brief, and clear; (iv) the speaker should try to make
her contribution true. PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 74 (1989). The differences between these
two positions are too subtle for the space available here. But see Callen, supra note 6, at 74-78.
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they argue, convey information that communicators do not expressly articulate,
and even information that the communicators may not consciously intend to con-
vey 39 For instance, the utterance "He took the car to work," most often conveys
any number of propositions that the communicator might not specifically intend,
such as that the subject of the sentence was employed and could drive."
Similarly, the utterance "Can you pass the pepper?" often conveys that the hearer
has access to pepper, that the speaker is requesting the pepper for herself or
someone else at the table, and any number of other propositions.4'
One who construed the Federal Rules in this light might well conclude that the
statements in Wright and Kearley should each be hearsay under the Rules -
each is offered for a proposition that the communicator would have generally
intended the audience to understand from the communication. The authors of the
letters in Wright could have expected the testator, as addressee of the letters, to
derive information about their opinions of him from the letters; the callers in
Kearley could have expected the persons answering the door or the phone to
understand that the callers thought Kearley was involved in the distribution of
drugs.42
In the excellent hornbook that they just completed, Professors Mueller and
Kirkpatrick43 offer a somewhat different view, limiting the reach of the hearsay
rule under the communicative intention model by reliance on a cross-cutting
argument: that many communications are predominantly actions, rather than
assertions. For example, if the police were to search an apartment with a war-
rant, and find an eviction notice addressed to X on a table in the apartment, they
argue that the notice is primarily an action and as such should not be hearsay if
offered to show that someone at least occasionally known as X lived at the apart-
ment.44 In their eyes, the landlord's behavior is primarily an effort to evict, so
that any hearsay dangers created by the communicative aspect of the landlord's
conduct are minimized.4 Their analysis would lead them to the conclusion that
Kearley is wrong, in that the calls were much more actions than assertions,4" and
39. While I am not entirely sure that other commentators to whom I refer in this section would concur, I
believe the critical intent in communication is general intent as opposed to conscious intent. I use "general
intent" to refer to that sense of intent in which a speaker intends to convey any proposition that she could rea-
sonably expect a hearer to infer based on her communication. See Callen, supra note 6, at 86-87 n. 190. I use
the term "could" rather than "would" because it is important to treat a communication as hearsay if offered as
evidence of a proposition when that proffer might be based on a misunderstanding of the speaker's intent. I use
"expect" because communications include considerable information other than the speaker's conscious conclu-
sions. As an example, none of the essayists will bother to say that their efforts are original, yet they would be
extremely offended if the reader drew another conclusion. Setting aside questions of academic integrity, they
would expect the reader to conclude that their essays offer new information - otherwise the essays would vio-
late Grice's maxims by providing less information than necessary, and failing to relate to the purpose of the
exchange: the exchange of new information. See GRICE, supra note 38.
40. MUELLER & KIRKPATRuCK, supra note 12, 8.12, at 820.
41. Callen, supra note 6, at 69-70. The source of the example is Raymond W Gibbs Jr., Contextual Effects
in Understanding Indirect Requests, 2 DiSCOURSE PROCESSES 1, 10 (1979).
42. Callen, supra note 6, at 102, 108.
43. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12.
44. Id. § 8.22, at 844.
45. See id.
46. Id. § 8.22, at 844-45.
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that Wright is questionable, in that the statements in the letters that pertained to
the addressee's competence amounted to respectful treatment combined with
efforts to do business with him. Therefore, they would argue, the letters are
behavior or action rather than assertions offered to show what they assert.47
Model 4: System-based Model
The final group of approaches consists of two opposing views that, to date,
have not been precisely addressed to the hearsay status of implied assertions. As
theories of the proper operation of the hearsay rule, and the exceptions, they
clearly have implications for the treatment of implied assertions.
Scholars who argue in favor of abolition of the hearsay rule (or at least for
drastic curtailment of restrictions other than those required by the Confrontation
Clause) often argue that the adversary system contains within it the means for
adequate exposition of whatever flaws there may be in a piece of hearsay evi-
dence. They believe that the parties have every incentive to make the best case
they can, and thus to forego most hearsay of truly questionable or cumulative
value. 8 Moreover, the adversarial process gives the party or parties affected by
evidence a marked incentive to point out flaws in the proffering party's evidence
or arguments. Assuming, at least, that the offer of hearsay is not an undue sur-
prise,49 the hearsay abolitionists argue that the adversary system is quite capable
of ferreting out flaws in the evidence, or of turning up whatever information the
factfinder may need to evaluate a piece of hearsay.
Further, the abolitionists argue that the system of hearsay rules and exceptions
is far too complex.5" They believe that there are only two essential evidentiary
provisions: a rule excluding irrelevant evidence, and another excluding evidence
whose probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect on the
opposing party.5" They might, for instance, admit the evidence in Kearley, on the
theory that it was relevant and not unduly prejudicial. On the other hand, the let-
ters in Wright were so old, and showed so little deliberate evaluation of the
addressee's competence, that these scholars might very well exclude them.52 Of
course, abolitionists do not believe that the courts currently follow their
approach, with the exception of the argument that the courts' results tend to par-
allel decisions that would follow the abolitionists' analysis.5 3
47. Id. § 8.9, at 813.
48. Ronald J. Allen, A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, 66 B.U. L. REV. 401, 429 (1986); Jack B.
Weinstein, Alternatives to the Present Hearsay Rules, 44 F.R.D. 375, 377 (1967).
49. Many proposals for increased admissibility of hearsay require that the party offering the hearsay give
notice in advance. E.g., Callen, supra note 6, at 100 n.255; Weinstein, supra note 48, at 380. Rules 803(24)
and 804(b)(5), hearsay exceptions that resulted from the drafters' efforts to increase the admissibility of hearsay
under the Federal Rules, require that the proffering party provide timely pre-trial notice.
50. E.g., Jack L. Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IowA L. REv. 331, 344-46 (1961).
51. Weinstein, supra note 48, at 380.
52. See Edmund M. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L.
REv. 177, 208 n.67 (1948).
53. Ronald J. Allen, The Evolution of the Hearsay Rule to a Rule ofAdmission, 76 MINN. L. REV. 797, 800
(1992).
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Counterarguments about the utility of the adversary system view the adversary
system as more the cause of hearsay problems than the cure. Consider, for
instance, the possibility that a hearsay declarant might be a bad witness, or even
that the declarant's testimony (as opposed to her out-of-court statement) might be
shown incredible on cross-examination. A party who stood to benefit from the
introduction of the declarant's out-of-court communication at the trial might pre-
fer to offer the communication through someone who overheard it, rather than to
call the declarant to the stand. 4 In effect, such a choice would be a deliberate
choice to mislead the factfinder, 5 because the hearsay would not be accompa-
nied by information that would enable the jury to evaluate the evidence proper-
ly. 6 Certainly, if such hearsay were admissible, the parties would have an incen-
tive to screen their hearsay evidence much less carefully than they currently do.
Finally, this viewpoint seems to correlate with proposals for reform of the excep-
tions to the hearsay rule to increase the production of evidence useful for the
evaluation of hearsay statements.5 ' At least one of its adherents believes that
abolishing the exceptions in favor of a general limit on admissibility, such as
Federal Rule 403, would have one of two undesirable consequences. Trial courts
would either admit massive quantities of evidence that should not be admitted, or
graft new requirements into 403 (for example a rule excluding misleading evi-
dence) that would amount to the reinstitution of the hearsay exceptions.5 8
Although none of the scholars who believe that the adversary system creates
incentives to offer questionable hearsay evidence has taken a position on Wright
or Kearley directly, it seems quite possible that they would consider Kearley
hearsay because of the possibility of fabrication. They might consider the letters
in Wright hearsay because doing otherwise might unduly encourage parties to
offer hearsay that might lack probative value when the factfinders lacked infor-
mation needed to evaluate that evidence.
III. CONCLUSION
I believe, for the reasons that I have more fully explored elsewhere, that the
possible meanings of our communications, like the possible descriptions of
54. Michael L. Seigel, Rationalizing Hearsay: A Proposal for a Best Evidence Hearsay Rule, 72 B.U. L.
REv. 893, 930 (1992).
55. Courts have pointed out that narrow construction of the definition of hearsay could create an incentive
for police officers to begin fabricating stories about declarants' statements, knowing that the false testimony
would become difficult to catch. United States v. Check, 582 E2d 668, 679-80, 683 (2d Cir. 1978); Park v.
Huff, 493 E2d 923, 927-28 (5th Cir. 1974), withdrawn on other grounds, 586 F2d 849 (en banc), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 824 (1975).
56. Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 IowA L. REv. 227, 282-84 (1988); Seigel, supra note
54, at 896-97; Eleanor Swift, A Foundation Fact Approach to Hearsay, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1339, 1370-71 (1987).
Charles R. Nesson & Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Hearsay: Requiring Foundational Testing and
Corroboration under the Confrontation Clause, 81 VA. L. REv. 149, 166-74 (1995), makes a very similar point,
but relies primarily on the Confrontation Clause for support.
57. Seigel, supra note 54, at 932-38; Swift, supra note 56, at 1355-57.
58. Eleanor Swift, Abolishing the Hearsay Rule, 75 CAL. L. REv. 495, 499-519 (1987).
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blackbirds, are infinite. 9 Accordingly, I think communicative behavior should
be hearsay whenever offered to show any proposition that the communicator
could have expected the audience to understand from the communication. Most
of the participants in the Symposium disagree, believing that the reach of the
hearsay rule should be either broader or narrower than I do.
Each of the essayists and commentators has made a noteworthy contribution to
the group's analysis of the issues that implied assertions raise. Although treatises
and cases announce that the question of the status of implied assertions is settled
(and the House of Lords believed it settled in American law), the discussion
shows that judgement is optimistic at best.
The question of the status of implied assertions has been debated, at the least,
since the first decision in Wright. The past century and one-half of debate has
helped lawyers and courts to understand the nature of human decisionmaking,
and the role of language and communication in the decisions of judges and
jurors. The debate has not always made things simple for law students, trial
lawyers, and judges. It has, though, offered some of the best thought in scholar-
ship on the law of evidence, as exemplified in the work (here and elsewhere) of
the essayists and commentators who have participated in this Symposium.
Ultimately, their efforts will help us to fully understand the evidentiary system,
and, in turn, improve it.
59. Callen, supra note 6.
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